There are several considerations when implementing a transaction processing system in cloud environments like Google App Engine (GAE). One of the most critical ones is the data integrity, since the cloud provides us with limited capability for it. Therefore we need to evaluate the applications and the cloud platform carefully from the data integrity viewpoint. This paper presents a model based data integrity evaluation method using the UPPAAL model checker. In order to make the model reusable, we built it as a set of application independent functional modules. On the other hand, the application unique functionalities are to be included in the model as UPPAAL functions written by the C-like UPPAAL language. The data integrity evaluation is performed in two different ways. One is a simulation based method in which the model is executed by the UPPAAL simulator to obtain the resultant variable values. The other is a verification based method in which the given integrity constraints are examined by the UPPAAL verifier using full state space search of the model.
INTRODUCTION
Data integrity is one of the most critical concern for distributed and concurrent systems, especially for those in cloud environments, e.g. Google App Engine (GAE) (Sanderson, 2009 ),Amazon Web Services (AWS) (van Vliet and Paganelli, 2011), or IBM Bluemix (IBM, 2015) . One of the typical systems is "database transaction processing", and the data integrity becomes crucial issue to make such systems robust (Nishida and Shinkawa, 2014) .
Therefore, the evaluation of the data integrity, from both application and platform viewpoints, for transaction processing in the cloud seems important to the spread of cloud computing. However, there are several difficulties in evaluating and validating this data integrity for transaction processing. The above difficulties are mainly caused by the different principle of the data integrity from traditional transaction processing, which is adopted by the cloud.
This new and different principle is referred to as "BASE" standing for Basically Available, Soft state, and Eventually consistent (Pritchett, 2008) . The basic differences between the "BASE" and the traditional principle "ACID" 1 (Gray and Reuter, 1993) , both of which are a set of properties to be satisfied in order to guarantee the data integrity in transaction processing, are 1. While the ACID restricts the concurrent database accesses within a critical section, the BASE allows arbitrary concurrent database accesses from any transaction by Basically Available property.
2. While the ACID postulates the transparent replication of the databases, the BASE tolerates the non-transparent replication by Soft state property.
3. While the ACID aims at the data integrity at every instant, the BASE tries for achieving the data integrity within some duration by Eventually consistent.
According to the above differences between these two principles, namely, BASE and ACID, we need a different approach to evaluating the data integrity in the cloud. Since this evaluation must be performed before system implementation, we need a precise model that reflects the cloud platform mechanism implementing the BASE principle, along with the detailed application logic that determines the data values. The reason why is that the data integrity of transaction processing is affected by both of them However, most modeling tools are specialized to a specific aspect of a system, e.g. software specification languages like "Z" (Spivey, 2008) (Fitzgerald et al., 2004) , and so on, which are specialized to the functional aspect, system modeling tools like "finite state machines", "Petri Nets" 2 (Reisig, 1985) , "SDL" (Thiel, 2001) and so on, which are specialized to the behavioral aspect, and architecture oriented modeling tools like "UML class diagrams", "block diagrams", and so on, which are specialized to the structural aspect.
On the other hand, it is desirable to express multiple aspects of a system simultaneously in a single model for accurate evaluation of the data integrity. For this purpose, we use the UPPAAL model checker (David et al., 2015) as a modeling and evaluation tool, since it can express the behavior of a system as a set of timed automata connected through communication channels, along with the functional and data structure specifications using a C-like language provided by the tool.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the basic concepts of the data integrity in the cloud, along with the transaction behavior following the BASE principle. Section 3 shows how transaction processing in the cloud is modelled using the UPPAAL. Section 4 discusses an evaluation and validation method for the data integrity using the UPPAAL.
TRANSACTION PROCESSING IN THE CLOUD
Data integrity in transaction processing has been hitherto relying on the ACID principle that is guaranteed by a transaction processing monitor (TPM) under which they are running. One of the backgrounds of the ACID is that the serialized execution of transactions always maintains the data integrity. Therefore, at the implementation level, the TPM isolates and serializes the critical sections of each transaction by locking mechanism. In addition, the ACID implicitly presumes the transparent replication, or synchronous replication of databases, to realize "C" (Consistency) property of it. This approach could cause the reduction of database availability, along with the performance degradation of transaction processing. In cloud computing, the ACID principle becomes a burden too much to guarantee the high availability, scalability, and stable performance of a system. Therefore, more light-weight mechanism to maintain the data integrity is desired in the cloud.
The "BASE" principle is a newly introduced principle to compromise the conflicting requirements, that is, availability and integrity in the cloud. In order to improve the availability, the BASE principle does not serialize the critical sections of each transaction, and allows the non-transparent or asynchronous replication. For maintaining the data integrity in such an environment, a TPM following the BASE principle provides us with "version" information instead of a locking mechanism, in order to determine whether the referred data are valid. If some of the referred data are invalid, the relevant transaction aborts the database updates. This mechanism is known as "optimistic locking".
Before discussing the data integrity of "BASE transactions" 3 , we need to define the concept of "data integrity" rigorously, in order to evaluate it effectively. The term "integrity" or "data integrity" is used differently in various contexts. For example, it focuses on the relationships between directories and file allocation information (e.g. i-node in the case of UNIX) at the operating system level, while it means the referential integrity that requires the existence of specific key values at the DBMS (Database Management System) level.
On the other hand, at the application level, there are no commonly recognized definitions, since it depends on the semantics of the data rather than their structure. Therefore, it seems more difficult to express the data integrity at this level than the former two levels. In order to determine whether an application can be performed in the cloud in the form of a transaction, we have to evaluate the data integrity at the application level in this circumstance.
Consequently, we first need to define rigorously the concept of "data integrity" at the application level using a unified notation. The data integrity at the application level can be defined as a set of constraints or rules on database occurrences. One of the ways to express these constraints is to use predicate logic formulae (Shinkawa, 2012) . In order to compose these logic formulae, we first have to define the language L and the structure S to provide the syntax and semantics of the formulae.
The languageL stipulates the usage of symbols regarding constants, variables, functions, predicates, and logical operators. In the data integrity evaluation, the L deals with database related matters. Therefore each symbol for a variable or constant represents an entity or its value in the databases. As for functions and predicates, there are two kinds of them, that is, database oriented and application oriented. The for-mer ones are the functions or predicates defined in a database manipulation language like SQL. On the other hand, the latter ones are those used in a specific application domain, e.g. production control, product management, or customer management applications.
Therefore, we are to prepare the L as composed of two parts, namely the application independent part and application dependent part. While the former part can be reused among the different application domains, the latter need to be built every time a new application is dealt with. On the other hand, the structure S consists of the domain of discourse D and the interpretation I . All the objects that are referred to from the functions and predicates, or assigned to variables and constants, must be the elements of the above D. In our case, this D includes 1. all the database instances DB i , 2. all the database records r (i) j in each DB i , and 3. all the attribute values a
The interpretation I maps each symbol in the L to an actual entity defined over the D. Some of functions and predicates are predefined in a database manipulation language e.g. SQL. Other symbols in the L are defined during the modeling process discussed in the succeeding sections.
Using the above language L and the structure S, each constraint to express an integrity rule is represented by a standardized logic formula (PCNFPrenex Conjunctive Normal Form)
where Q i is a variable with the quantifier "∀", e.g. ∀x i , P i j is a predicate, and t
is a term composed of variables, constants, and functions (Schoening, 2008) .
There are several kinds of constraints regarding data integrity, e.g. restrictions on data values, existence of a record with some specific key, or constraints on the values derived from a set of records. However, any kinds of those constraints can be expressed by the above predicate logic formulae in the form of PCNF.
MODELING THE TRANSACTION PROCESSING WITH THE BASE PRINCIPLE
Once the rules or constraints for data integrity are expressed in the form of predicate logic formulae, the next step is to model the transaction processing with the BASE principle, which updates the databases in the cloud. For this modeling, we use the UPPAAL model checker, or the UPPAAL in short. The UP-PAAL expresses a system as a set of finite timed automata with variables, along with the functions that manipulate them. Each timed automaton consists of states (locations in terms of the UPPAAL) and arcs (edges in terms of the UPPAAL) that represent the state transitions. Boolean expressions with clock type variables can be used as time constraints, which are associated with any above stated location or edge. These timed automata are defined as parameterizable templates, and must be instantiated by the system definition.
In order to make the models reusable, these templates should be appropriately modularized. In our approach, the behavior of the transaction processing in the cloud is categorized into five types, namely "Initialization", "Scheduling", "Thread", "Database", and "Replication". Each module works as follows.
1. The "Initialization" module sets up the databases to be used during the simulation. The databases are expressed as three-dimensional integer arrays. The first dimension represents the replication number, the second represents the record or row number, and the third represents the attributes in the database schema.
2. The "Scheduling" module sends a transaction to one of the "Thread" instances to process it. A transaction is expressed in the form of integer array, each element of which represents an argument (or parameter) to the transaction. These integer arrays compose a two dimensional "transaction list" 4 .
3. The "Thread" module performs the functionality of each transaction. The functionality is determined by the transaction type and the specified arguments in the "transaction list". The database update requests from a transaction are routed to the "Database" module through a UPPAAL channel.
4. The "Database" module is to be instantiated as many as database replications. Each instance reads and updates a specific replication of a database expressed in the form of an integer array.
5. The "Replication" module tries to keep the replicated databases identical in an asynchronous way, implementing the Soft state property. This module is instantiated only once and deals with all the databases and their replications.
In addition to the above modules, we have to prepare several functions to make the model executable and verifiable. These functions are written by a C-like UPPAAL unique language. While the model structure is common among application domain, these functions are application unique and must be built for each application domain. Figure 1 through Figure 5 show an example of the above UPPAAL modules. As stated above, the structure of their five modules can be commonly used among different application domains, including function names and channels associated with edges and locations in the model. However, the implementation of these functions and other supplemental functions are differently built among different application domains. For example, the function "dbLoad()" in Figure 1 represents a function that initialize all the databases in the system, and the name is common for all applications. However, its implementation usually different among them, depending on the structure and usage of the databases. Figure 6 shows a sample implementation of the "dbLoad()" function for a simplified library application.
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When executing the model, these modules are instantiated through the system definition as shown in Figure 7 . In this example, three concurrent threads and three database replications are assumed.
These modules operate as follows. 1. Firstly, the "dbLoad" function of the Initialization module is invoked to prepare all the databases. At this time, only the associated edge is eligible for transition, since other modules are waiting for signals through the UPPAAL channels.
2. After the completion of the "dbLoad" function, the Scheduler module is activated through the "initS" channel.
3. The scheduler module sends a signal to the Thread module through the channel "S2T".
4. The Thread module selects a transaction from the predefined transaction list by the "selectTran" function, and sends a signal to the Database module through the channel "T2D[m]" channel, where the "m" is a replication number.
5. The Database module accesses and updates the databases. Evaluating Data Integrity in the Cloud using the UPPAAL Figure 6 : "dbLoad" Function.
/ / P l a c e t e m p l a t e i n s t a n t i a t i o n s h e r e . 6. The step 2 to 5 are repeated until all the predefined transactions are processed.
The version control and commit/abort processes are embedded in the Database module as functions.
DATA INTEGRITY EVALUATION USING THE UPPAAL
The UPPAAL model checker provides us with three major functionalities. The first is a graphical model editor with programming capability that we have used in the previous section. The second is a model simulator that executes the model we build to show an instance of its behavior. The third is a model verifier that examines all the possible behavior whether the model satisfies the given properties written in the form of CTL (Computational Logic Tree) formulae. Therefore, two alternative ways are available to evaluate the data integrity of transaction processing. The first is to execute the model to obtain the values of the variables for the database records at each state transition. As discussed in the previous section, the data integrity is expressed as a set of predicate logic formulae in the form of PCNF. In the UP-PAAL model, these logic formulae refer to the variables associated with the database records and attributes. Therefore, we can determine whether the data integrity is maintained in the transaction processing by examining the above variables using a function implementing each constraint logic formula. Since this method can evaluate only one instance of the system behavior selected by the simulation, we have to perform the simulation for every possible behavior. However, this possible behavior could be uncountable. Therefore this method would be sampling based evaluation.
On the other hand, the UPPAAL verifier provides us with a capability of full state space search against a set of CTL formulae. In order to evaluate the data integrity in this way, we have to transform a set of predicate logic formulae into a set of CTL formulae. Unlike the predicate logic formulae, CTL formulae can include the path operator "A" and "E" which deal with state transition paths of a system, and temporal operator " " and "♢" which define the validation points of the formulae. In addition, there are no quantifiers "∀" and "∃" in CTL. Therefore, several considerations should be taken into account in the above transformation from predicate logic formulae into CTL formulae. These considerations include 1. If a property "P" must always holds in a predicate logic formulae, the CTL formula is "A P".
2. If a property "P" always implies a property "Q", then the CTL formula is "A (P → Q)".
3. If a property "P" eventually implies a property "Q", the CTL formula is "A (P → ♢Q).
4. If a property "P" must hold at specific point, we introduce a boolean variable to express the point, and set it true at the point in the model. In this case we need to modify the model. 5. If the original predicate logic formula includes the quantifiers "∀" and "∃", we introduce a boolean function into the model to examine whether all of or some of the variables in the model satisfy the formula. A model modification is required in this case again. After the above transformation is completed, we can evaluate the data integrity by running the verifier that the UPPAAL provides.
This CTL based evaluation seems simpler than the simulator based one, however it performs full state space search and consumes huge computing resources. As a result, it takes long time to obtain the result. In such cases, we need to reduce the model, by decreasing the number of variables or values to be assigned.
CONCLUSIONS
In cloud environments, the behavior of transaction processing is considerably different from the traditional ones. One of the major reasons is that the cloud introduces a new principle for the data integrity called "BASE", instead of the traditional "ACID". In order to make the transaction processing stable in the cloud, we need to reveal the behavior of it clearly, and evaluate the data integrity rigorously.
This paper proposed a model based data integrity evaluation using the UPPAAL model checker. In order to make the model easily understandable and reusable, we composed it using five functional modules, namely, "Initialization", "Scheduling", "Thread", "Database", and "Replication", following the BASE principle. While the model structure can be reused among different application domains, we need to build application unique functions for the model.
The UPPAAL provides us with two different ways to evaluate the data integrity. One is a simulationbased evaluation which examines only one instance of the behavior of transaction processing. The other is a verifier-based evaluation which examines full state space search to determine whether the given constraints are satisfied. While the latter way can evaluate the integrity more precisely, we need to transform the original predicate logic formulae into the CTL formulae. In addition, it consumes huge computing resources for full state space search. and takes long time to obtain the evaluation results.
